S. Hrg. 104–689

# SAUDI ARABIA AND BEIRUT: LESSON LEARNED ON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS



HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

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TUESDAY, JULY 9, 1996

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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence



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## OPENING STATEMENTS

# SAUDI ARABIA AND BEIRUT: LESSON LEARNED ON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS

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**TUESDAY, JULY 9, 1996**

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
*Washington, DC.*

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen Specter (Chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Specter, DeWine and Kerrey of Nebraska.

Also present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk.

Chairman SPECTER. The Intelligence Committee will now proceed. Senator Kerrey has a commitment, so I will yield to him for his opening statement at the outset.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the witnesses. My commitment requires me to go for about 5 minutes and I will be back, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

These hearings are, Mr. Chairman, I believe a very appropriate and important response to the bombing in Dhahran, and it is always appropriate for this committee to look into intelligence support to our deployed military forces. Much has been made of the defensive preparations undertaken by Air Force commanders in Dhahran, but those defensive decisions are understandable only in the context of the intelligence available to those commanders at the time. The safety of our troops today, and our ability to go on the offensive against the people who did this, are similarly dependent on intelligence. So our committee has a significant role in the investigation of this bombing and in the correction of the intelligence deficiencies that may be uncovered.

As we proceed, I have several concerns. But first, I want to avoid a rush to judge or condemn without all the facts. I noted, for example, a story in Sunday's *New York Times* that has been repeated, that was repeated twice as I watched it on this morning's news, that asserted that CIA misjudged, the "bomb-making capabilities of militants in Saudi Arabia, concluding that they could not build a bomb larger than two hundred pounds." I, as you as well, Mr. Chairman, have checked with the CIA and they know of no basis for this assertion. They understand the size of a bomb is simply a function of the target and the amount of explosive available to the

terrorists, so they make no estimates of size. If there is evidence to the contrary, that CIA did make such an estimate, I am certainly open to it, but I haven't seen it yet.

Second, I am concerned that in our response in Washington to this attack, as we try to learn what mistake was made by Americans or Saudis so we can defend ourselves better in the future, we should also consider the big picture. The big picture is our mission in the gulf region and our dedication to continuing that mission. But there is another, new element to our presence in the gulf region. We were attacked in Saudi Arabia, and we have been attacked twice. Someone is making war upon us.

Now, we Americans know something about making war. We know the offense always, eventually, defeats even the best defense. So while we review the situation in Dhahran leading up to this bombing and use what we learn to defend ourselves more effectively, we should also be seeking means to go on the offensive, seeking ways to attack this new enemy and destroy his ability to make war on us. However, we don't know who this enemy is at the moment or where his center of gravity is, so our first requirement is intelligence. That is why the most important question for our own committee to ask is, is America dedicating the intelligence resources necessary to this terrorist target, so we can have the knowledge we must have to attack and destroy this group and punish its nation-state sponsor, if there is one. We should also ask, if we concentrate our collection and analytical efforts against these terrorists, how will our other high priority efforts around the world be affected?

I myself am very concerned that we still appear to be thin in the analysis and the ability to convert the intelligence into something that is useful to our policymakers.

Without a concentrated intelligence effort, applying national intelligence assets of all types, America will not be able to go on the offensive, and we will stay on defense. Our options will be limited to how far to move the fence, and that is no way to win a war.

Mr. Chairman, as I said, I will be leaving, I'll be coming back, and I look forward to the witnesses.

Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey.

I concur with Senator Kerrey's assessment that the hearings should proceed on an investigation, an inquiry as to the adequacy of U.S. intelligence. As Senator Kerrey has noted, we should not rush to judgment.

The comments made in the press accounts as to CIA responsibility are matters which have to be inquired into without any prejudgment.

This hearing was announced on July 1, and subsequent to our setting of our hearings for today, the Senate Armed Services Committee announced hearings for the same time. We had suggested with the Senate Armed Services Committee the possibility of joint hearings, but that was declined. We had thought about deferring our hearings until tomorrow and the bulk of our hearing will be conducted tomorrow, but there are a number of witnesses who are here today who could not be present tomorrow, so we decided to go

ahead with the first panel which we have with us at the present time.

We have a very distinguished panel. Admiral Long, who was chairman of the Long Commission which investigated the bombings at Beirut. Mr. Robert Murray, who is president of the Center for Naval Analysis, was a member of the Long Commission. Lieutenant General Trainor, and Colonel Pat Lang.

The focus tomorrow will be on the second panel on current Mid East Security Assessment; the third panel, looking to the future; the fourth panel on Executive oversight.

The experience from the Long Commission at Beirut is especially appropriate because of the comments by Secretary of Defense Perry in assessing the 3,000- to 5,000-pound bomb in Dhahran, saying that this is more then tenfold larger than bombs that have been used in similar incidents in the Mid East, which appears to be contrary to the fact as to what did happen in Beirut with a 12,000-pound bomb having been involved there.

A major issue is to the adequacy of the intelligence work on the efforts to question the four terrorists who were executed on May 31 for the assassination, terrorist murders of five Americans in Riyadh back on November 13, of last year, the efforts made by the FBI to do that questioning and what efforts were made by the CIA and what efforts were made to pursue that questioning at a higher level.

In dealing with the Saudis, we are dealing with an ally where there is a very substantial mutual interest in proceeding to protect Mid East oil, to protect U.S. interests there. We are also very aware of a very substantial difference in cultures. We have the experience at the beginning of the gulf war where U.S. military was not permitted to question Iraqi prisoners of war; only by writing given to the Saudis. We have the situation of the difference in culture illustrated by the prohibition which exists to this day that the only religious ceremonies which may be practiced in Saudi Arabia are those of the Moslems. Not so long ago, going back to the early to mid–80's period, where Americans were actually detained and arrested in their homes for praying in their homes, and detained.

We have the question of the moving of the fence, and we will be making an inquiry as to the Pentagon published protocol, written instructions, or established policy, and an issue as to appropriate Pentagon oversight.

We had recently the report of the Inspector General of the CIA saying that in the Aldrich Ames situation that the Directors of Central Intelligence Woolsey, Webster and Gates, would be held accountable under the captain of the ship doctrine, even though they did not have specific information.

We frequently decry an attitude of business as usual, a necessity for a sense of urgency where such important interests are on the line and where there are very substantial warnings as to problems of terrorism.

There is the issue of the stability of the Saudi government, which is a matter which has to be inquired into, being very central to the security of our forces there. A question as to the necessity for the size of the military there, whether it could be reduced, whether overflights could be conducted with less military, whether it could

be conducted from aircraft carriers without such a large presence on Saudi soil.

I am pleased to welcome at this time our very distinguished panel. Admiral Long, Mr. Robert Murray, former Lieutenant General Mick Trainor, and Colonel Pat Lang. As I said, we had considered putting the hearings off until tomorrow, but have decided to go ahead.

Former Lieutenant General Mick Trainor was the Chief of Staff for Operations of the Marine Corps during the Beirut bombing, and currently is a member of the faculty of the Kennedy School of Government, a former author with the *New York Times*. He has commitments which require an early departure, so we turn to you at this time, General Trainor, with our thanks for your being here.

## STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BERNARD E. "MICK" TRAINOR, USMC (Ret.) FORMER DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS, POLICIES AND OPERATIONS FOR THE MARINE CORPS

General TRAINOR. Thank you, Senator, and I appreciate the invitation. I am sorry for the inconvenience of asking you to adjust some of the committee's schedule to accommodate my requirements.

I don't have an opening statement to make, in the interest of time. However, I do want to say that, as you pointed out, I was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations at the time that the American Embassy was bombed, in April 1983, and also when the Marine barracks went up in November of that year.

I had the honored but sad duty, after the Embassy bombing, to accompany the team that went out there to return the bodies.

So between the Embassy bombing and the barracks bombing, I was—I have been scarred by that experience and it has lived with me to this day.

Subsequent to that we have had two terrorist bombings domestically in the United States, with the World Trade Center and with the Oklahoma City bombing, and then of course, last November we had the bombing in Riyadh, and I have to say to myself, do we never learn. The MO of the terrorists are exactly the same in all instances over these years, and yet we never seem to be able to accommodate to them.

I feel that one of the reasons for this is that there is a sense of complacency I think forces overseas just have difficulty in adjusting to the fact that there is a real threat, and it becomes business as usual. I think this latest incident in Dhahran is an example of that. Steps were taken to improve the situation, but the threat was real and it was imminent and those that had the immediate responsibility, in my judgment, were not—were not responsive to the immediate threat.

There were passive steps that could have been taken in the interim while negotiations were taking place to extend the perimeter, such as moving the troops out of the building, doubling them up someplace else or even putting them in tents. But I think there is a tendency within the military today to put too much emphasis on the quality of life and comfort to the detriment of security, putting the troops at risk in the process because you are being nice to

them. I think that is a factor that played here that has not yet been addressed by either press or in the public forum.

I open myself to your questions, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, just a few questions before proceeding with the other witnesses, and I know you do have obligations otherwise—other places.

What is the immediate lesson to be learned from the size of a bomb which is placed in Beirut, some 12,000 pounds—and we'll get into this in greater detail with Admiral Long and Mr. Murray—what is the lesson to be learned from that?

General TRAINOR. First, as you have pointed out, intelligence. We have to have a better intelligence system to estimate the threat.

Second, there has to be proactive steps taken to neutralize that threat—proactive steps in terms of penetrating those who are wishing us ill; proactive steps in terms of reaction forces that are on the scene that can take action very, very quickly.

Then the passive steps. I think the passive steps are the ones that are, in a sense, least costly, because these can be accomplished by common sense; that if you are under an active threat—and indeed any time we are overseas, I think we are under an active threat—make sure that the troops are in cantonments that are relatively secure from the reach of any sort of explosive threat, which seems to be the major threat that the forces face today, but not the exclusive threat. In other words, a common sense approach to protecting the troops. You get the troops dug in as necessary to ensure that the threat against them, while never being eliminated, will be minimized.

So those three points. The lessons learned are better intelligence, a proactive and an active defense, and an effective passive defense.

Chairman SPECTER. General Trainor, what steps can be taken by intelligence to alert the field commanders as to the kinds of risk which you face in Beirut or the kinds of risks which were faced in Dhahran?

General TRAINOR. Well, I am not an intelligence expert, but as an operational commander I would expect the Intelligence Community to give me the general threat analysis that they have and then be as specific as possible as the situation comes along, without raising false alarms, which is frequently the case with the Intelligence Community. In a certain sense, to cover themselves, they are constantly giving you threats. Well, I need some sort of an effective intelligence filter to tell me the degree of veracity of those threats. But in no way does that absolve me from the responsibility to take care of my troops.

So in the absence of concrete intelligence or uncertain intelligence, I would take the steps or I should take the steps necessary to minimize the threat to my forces until such time as the threat becomes more specific and I can take some action on it.

Chairman SPECTER. Looking back at the threat to the troops in Beirut, back on the October 23, 1983 incident, in retrospect, what steps, if any, could have been taken to minimize that risk?

General TRAINOR. In the context of the threat at the time, there were two particular threats. There was the threat of the car bombing or truck bombing, although it was cast in the terms of car bombing at the time. The other threat which was the more active

threat, was that the Marines were being constantly shelled from the Shouf Mountains and being shot at from the outskirts of their cantonment.

The steps that were taken there were that the line-troops were dug-in in trenches, a la Korea and World War I. But the most secure building for the support troops was in the very building that blew up. It had withstood the shelling and the bombing during the battle for the Beirut airport between the Israelis and the Syrians. In a sense, from the conventional threat of artillery fire, mortar fire, and direct small arms fire, that building was probably the safest place for them to be.

But in the process and in the face of that immediate threat which was the constant shelling, the threat of the bombing was overlooked. In the interest of preventing innocents from being killed in the adjacent Beirut airport, in the fear of an accidental discharge which might hit some civilians, the rules of engagement, if you will, the interior guard orders were modified. The troops on the post that were guarding the approaches did not have the magazines in their weapons and therefore they couldn't bring immediate direct fire on any threat from a car bomb, and that turned out to be a mistake.

Chairman SPECTER. General Trainor, has your experience given you any special insights into our relationship with the Saudis in terms of how we deal with them on pressing to question people like the Iraqi prisoners of war?

General TRAINOR. Well, of course, all of that took place subsequent to my retirement from the Marine Corps, and indeed after I had left the *New York Times.* But I did co-author a book on the Gulf War and naturally in the process of doing research on that, delved into some of these cultural differences. Yes, there are enormous cultural differences between the Western world, particularly the United States, and the Arab world, and in particular the Saudi Arabian world, which is the keeper of the sacred sites of Mecca and Medina.

Now, you're not going to change that, but what you do then is modify your association to take that into account. If that is what you have to live with, you take that into account, and in the process, you try to modify it to your advantage insofar as you possibly can. But again, in no way can you simply shrug your shoulders and say, well, this is the way they do business, we can't change it, and then assume that you have taken care of the problems.

That presumably was somewhat of—at least the evidence suggests that was somewhat the case in this instance where presumably the Saudis were asked to move the perimeter fence on two occasions. They apparently dragged their feet and the sense was, we'll keep working this issue without taking into account the immediacy of the threat as represented by the Riyadh bombing and the active threats against the Americans which resulted from the beheading of the Riyadh bombers.

The fact that the Saudis were tied-up in some sort of a bureaucratic process in no way absolved the commanding officer on the scene from taking the necessary steps to protect his troops.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, before moving to the steps which the commander in the field might have taken to accommodate, in the

face of two requests and not an affirmative answer from the Saudis, and looking to the future as to what we ought to be doing to try to prevent a recurrence, what sort of a suggestion would you have as to what our military should or must do when they make a request on a couple of occasions and there is no affirmative answer?

General TRAINOR. This is not peculiar to Saudi Arabia. It would apply everywhere. The local commander on the scene and his staff work with their counterparts, hopefully to solve the problem. If that's not getting anywhere, then he has to kick it up the line. In this instance, the commander should kick it up to the theater commander. The theater commander, which in this instance was CENTCOM, has the operational responsibility for the area, and that includes security. The theater commander should weigh in with his Saudi counterparts to solve the problem. If he is not getting anywhere, the next thing is for him to kick the problem up to the Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense who is the immediate superior of the theater CINC.

Chairman SPECTER. Was this the kind of a threat with a perimeter of only 80 feet that should have been kicked up to those heights?

General TRAINOR. Given the threat, the steps necessary to protect the forces required whatever action was required to increase security. If it couldn't be resolved locally and it couldn't be resolved at the theater level, and I don't know whether it ever was kicked up to the theater level, but if it was and it couldn't be resolved at that level, then it has to be kicked up to the national level to the Department of Defense and the State Department to take the steps necessary to make the necessary adjustments.

In the meantime, however, it is still the responsibility of the theater commander, and it's still the responsibility of the local commander to take the active and passive steps necessary, within their means, to minimize the threat that has been clearly recognized.

Chairman SPECTER. You had talked earlier about the possibility of moving into tents. Would you elaborate about that and what other steps might be taken to minimize the risk to the troops if in fact the perimeter cannot be moved farther out?

General TRAINOR. If the perimeter cannot be moved, and you have troops that are clearly exposed to a threat then the thing to do, in my judgment, you get the troops that are exposed out of those exposed positions. Now, as I understand it, there were buildings further back in the compound that by doubling up, you could put the forces in there. In terms of Building 131, which was the target of the bomb, you could put your administrative activities, the store rooms, the Xeroxes, that sort of thing, on the outside of the building. The whole point is, get the troops away from the blast effects of the bomb. If you don't have room further in the compound, there is nothing wrong with putting up tents and putting the troops in tents. The Marine squadrons that are in Aviano, Italy, who have been flying over Bosnia and providing the air cover for the dramatic rescue of the airman who was shot down there, have been out there since 1993, are not living in hotels or fancy billets—they're living in tents which are in secure compounds.

That is the first order of business, to make sure that the troops are in secure cantonments and their comfort and leisure is a secondary concern of the commander—or at least it should be. But the troops must do what is good for them, not what is comforting for them. I think there was a breakdown in this instance.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you have other instances in mind where troops were moved into tents under circumstances similar to the one you've already mentioned?

General TRAINOR. I think you can look at the situation in Bosnia, where the threat is somewhat ill-defined, but we know it's there. The U.S. Army, when they moved into Bosnia, the first thing that they saw to was that their cantonments were secure against any sort of threat, whether it's a terrorist threat or whether it was an active combat threat. They established little hedgehogs of defense. Now, they did that the right way. We've seen lots of stories in the press, how there was a great deal of discomfort on the part of the troops when they went to Bosnia. Well, the troops understood that and they saw that their security was of primary importance and their mission was of primary importance, not their comfort.

So there you have a laudable incident of a threat to the force being taken seriously and passive and active steps being taken to ensure security of the force. I just hope that the forces in Bosnia, do not become complacent. Because the minute they do become complacent, they are going to increase their vulnerability.

Chairman SPECTER. General Trainor, we promised we'd have you out by 11:30 and we're 3 minutes over. We thank you very much for coming. We would like you to be available for further consultation on an informal basis.

General TRAINOR. Thank you, Senator; thank you very much.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you; thank you very much.

I'd like to turn now to Admiral Robert Long. He had a very distinguished service, retired now from the U.S. Navy. Was chairman of the Long Commission which was charged with the responsibility to investigate the bombings in Beirut on October 23, 1983, which resulted in the fatalities to some 241 Marines, and is sort of the, regrettably landmark for a tragedy for a bomb, which has some similarities, regrettably, to what occurred on June 25.

Admiral Long, we very much appreciate your taking time to join us and look forward to your testimony.

## STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT LONG, CHAIRMAN, LONG COMMISSION

Admiral LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I don't have a prepared statement, but I would like to make a few comments with your permission.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you had a very long statement on your report, which I have here, very lengthy and very incisive.

Admiral LONG. Well, I am pleased to respond to your's and Senator Kerrey's request that I appear before this Select Committee on Intelligence. I was privileged a few years back to serve on an advisory panel to this committee, under the chairmanship of Eli Jacobs. So I have some appreciation for the importance of the things that you do.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read just a few excerpts from the DOD Commission——

Chairman SPECTER. Fine.

Admiral LONG [continuing]. That looked at the terrorist bombing of the Marines at Beirut in October 1983.

These are three general observations that I think are important here that we review.

First of all, terrorism. "The Commission believes that the most important message it can bring to the Secretary of Defense is that the October 23, 1983 attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team headquarters in Beirut was tantamount to an act of war, using the medium of terrorism. Terrorist warfare, sponsored by sovereign state or organized political entities to achieve political objectives is a threat to the United States that is increasing at an alarming rate.

"The October 23 catastrophe underscores the fact that terrorist warfare can have significant political impact, and demonstrates that the United States, and specifically the Department of Defense, is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs to be done on an urgent basis to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare."

The next general observation deals with intelligence support. "Even the best of intelligence will not guarantee the security of any military position. However, specific data on the terrorist threats to the U.S. multinational force, data which could best be provided by carefully trained intelligence agents, could have enabled the military, the Marine commander, to better prepare his force and facilities to blunt the effectiveness of a suicidal vehicle attack of great explosive force."

"The Marine commander did not have effective U.S. human intelligence. That's HUMINT support. The paucity of U.S. controlled HUMINT is partly due to U.S. policy decisions to reduce HUMINT collection worldwide. The United States has a HUMINT capability commensurate with the resources and time that has been spent to acquire it. The lesson of Beirut is that we must have better HUMINT to support military planning and operations. We see here a critical repetition of a long line of similar lessons learned during crisis situations in many other parts of the world."

Next, on accountability. "The Commission holds the view that military commanders are responsible for the performance of their subordinates. The commander can delegate some or all of his authority to his subordinates, but he cannot delegate his responsibility for the performance of the forces he commands. In that sense, the responsibility of military command is absolute. This view of command authority and responsibility guided the commission in its analysis of the effectiveness of the exercise of command authority and responsibility of the chain of command charged with the security and performance of the U.S. multinational force."

Another thing on intelligence, Mr. Chairman. "The Commission concludes that although the U.S. multinational force commander received a large volume of intelligence warnings concerning potential terrorist threats prior to October 23, 1983, he was not provided with the timely intelligence tailored to his specific operational

needs that was necessary to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced."

"The Commission further concludes that HUMINT support to the U.S.-multinational force commander was ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to his needs. The Commission believes that the paucity of U.S. controlled HUMINT provides the U.S.-multinational force commander is, in large part, due to policy decisions which have resulted in a U.S. HUMINT capability commensurate with the resources and time that have been spent to acquire it."

I guess the last one I would offer, Mr. Chairman, and that is the military response to terrorism. "The Commission concludes that international terrorist acts, endemic to the Middle East, are indicative of an alarming worldwide phenomenon that poses an increasing threat to U.S. personnel and facilities. The Commission concludes that state-sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare, and that adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy, which seeks to deter attack or reduce its effectiveness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs to be supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range of timely military response capabilities."

So those are just some of the things that I picked out, Mr. Chairman, that I think are particularly pertinent here to the tragedy in Saudi Arabia.

Chairman SPECTER. Admiral Long, picking up on your point about state-sponsored terrorism, there have been two responses in a military context in the course of the past decade. Back in 1986, the United States responded to a bombing of Libya after the proofs were established about Libyan involvement in the discotheque. In 1993, the United States responded with a missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in response to the finding of Iraqi implications and complicity in an attempt to assassinate former President Bush.

When you talk about state-sponsored terrorism requiring a military response, could you amplify that and give us some suggestion as to your evaluation as to the level of proof required? Start there, and then the next question would be the appropriate kind of response, bearing in mind the generalized doctrine of proportionality under international law.

Admiral LONG. Mr. Chairman, when we talk about state-sponsored terrorism, I think we should also include terrorism sponsored by political organizations that are not necessarily independent states. It seems to me that, broadly, what we are talking about here is first of all that we should have some sort of an umbrella at the top of political, diplomatic, arrangements. I would say I applauded the President and his efforts here just recently in France to get some sort of an agreement on political-diplomatic actions opposing terrorism.

Then after that, it then comes down to policies and training of our own military, for the Department of Defense. First of all, in the education and training process, we need to have our troops and particularly the commanders, well aware of the cultural, the political, the economic, the religious aspects of the area where they are. They also must have some appreciation of the kind of terrorist

threat that could be there. It could be not only sniper fire, or a small bomb, but it can be a large bomb, as you pointed out in the Beirut situation. Increasingly I have become more and more worried about the use of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly biological weapons. We can talk more about that later.

But then after that, we have to make sure, up the chain of command, that the mission is very clear as to what those troops are there for. This was a major deficiency in Beirut. The mission—the mission never changed, but the fact was that what the troops were doing there did change. Along with that, we have to make sure that the rules of engagement are adequate so that the troops can defend themselves if necessary.

Beyond that, then we have the questions of adequate policy doctrine that goes with that, and then of course, is the security aspects of any troops that are not only abroad, but certainly within the United States also.

Chairman SPECTER. One follow-up before I yield to Senator Kerrey. When you talk about expanding the responsibility from state-sponsored terrorism to political organizations, we have political organizations which appear to move from one country to another. Are you suggesting that there be a military response, a DELTA Force response, perhaps, to these political organizations which are mobile or are untamed or are harbored by some countries which do not take effective action themselves to stop those marauding terrorists?

Admiral LONG. One point I think I should make very clearly, and that is essentially almost all terrorist acts have a political objective. We not only have these terrorist groups or groups that will use terrorism overseas in the Middle East, but as you well know, we have some of these political groups here within the United States. I do believe that if you can go ahead and prevent the terrorist act, that is the best. But within the options, let's say, your things that are available to the United States, to the National Command Authority, certainly the ability to go in and take out these known groups with military force certainly should be an option.

Now, that is not the option you would use in every case. There are other things that you would use, but I think that we need to look at what are the options that we have for the President in order to be able to handle these terrorist acts.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, when you say go in and take out these organizations, would that extend to going into another country where they were harbored?

Admiral LONG. I think that an example of this, Mr. Chairman, would be the pre-emptive attacks that we did when we learned that there was terrorist activity going on there in Northern Africa. There has been some support here that I have read recently that we should be prepared to go in and actually take out known individual terrorists.

I do not support that. I think that could well be contrary to some of the values that we have in the United States. But if we are talking about facilities, if we are talking about capabilities, if we are talking about the development of chemical warfare plants, biological warfare plants, then I think clearly the President should have

some options there that if political, diplomatic negotiations fail, then he could turn to some military options.

Chairman SPECTER. There are a number of points that you have raised that I want to come back to, but let me yield at this point to Senator Kerrey.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my opening remarks, and you are kind of getting into it now, we're talking—in fact, in your Commission's report, you urged Congress and other policymakers, to recognize that terrorism is essentially an act of war.

Admiral LONG. Yes.

Vice Chairman KERREY. When one responds to these kind of actions, it seems to me you have to be prepared for a counterresponse.

In the Libyan bombing, for example, the attack, we suffered a response that very often isn't mentioned. We talk about the great strike we had on Libya, but Libya then responded and knocked out Pan Am 103—that's about 270 people on that plane—then they hit a French aircraft, including the wife of our Ambassador to Chad. So it seems to me that one is going to have to be prepared, if you are going to take that kind of action, whether it is going in and taking out the terrorists, you have to be prepared to hold yourself responsible for the follow-up and be prepared to follow up one more time. You can't come into this thing and assume it is going to be an overnight press release that you put out saying that you have been courageous and tough.

In Beirut, it seems to me your analysis of it was that what we had was an initial Battalion Landing Team goes in, neutral, and the mission creeped so that they no longer had the appearance of neutrality, and that created at least part of the problem.

It seems to me in Saudi Arabia we are there under no pretense of neutrality. We are there with an announced declaration that we have taken one side or the other.

Your recommendation, Admiral Long, said that you urged the Department of Defense to recognize the importance of state-sponsored terrorism. What I would like to know is if you think that DOD has either failed or has responded to the importance? Have they responded to the recommendations that you have made after 1983?

Admiral LONG. All of the recommendations that the Commission presented to the Secretary of Defense, I believe without exception, were approved by the Secretary of Defense. I am not totally familiar with the day-to-day operations of the Defense Department. My sense is that this is a wake up call, and I think that the principal message that I would give to Secretary Perry, if I had the opportunity to speak to him personally, and that is that I would urge that he would convene again an independent commission—and I stress independent—its charter should be broad like our Commission was. We were essentially given license to look at almost anything we wanted that related to Beirut.

I would hope that this Commission that has been set up—and I am not familiar with the terms of reference—but I would hope that this commission would be not only looking specifically at what happened in Dhahran, but also to the effectiveness of intelligence, to

look in at the political-diplomatic actions that should be in place, and should be looking at a much broader range of threats than just a single 3,000 pound bomb, because my judgment is that we are not going to see less of this, we are going to see more terrorism used, and much of it against the United States.

Vice Chairman KERREY. One of the other recommendations you had in your Commission, Admiral, was that there was no institutionalized process for the fusion of intelligence into an all source support mechanism. For either you or Mr. Murray, I would appreciate your telling me how you think we are doing today? How effective is the fusion today, and specifically how effective is this—the one mechanism that has been identified, the NIST, the National Intelligence Support Team, in Riyadh, how well they are doing fusing intel and pushing tailored intel to the national system to the user.

Admiral LONG. Senator, I think we are doing much better today. Let me just observe that there was very little, if any, real support of military operations by the CIA at that particular time. Most of the CIA's efforts were directed to the Soviet Union. When I was commander of U.S. Military Forces in the Pacific, I could almost give you the serial number of nuclear weapons that were being dumped by the Soviets into the Pacific Ocean. But I did not know what was going on in North Korea or the Philippines.

I think that has been changed today. There is a much greater emphasis by the Director of Central Intelligence to support military operations. I would strongly urge this commission that is being set up, to look at this area. How well is that new system working, how effective is the HUMINT that we are trying to collect, how effectively is the information that we are getting, being analyzed and how well is the information being distributed. All of those things need to be looked at.

But intelligence, clearly, is an area that, in my judgment, we don't need less intelligence, we need more intelligence because of the diversity of the threats the United States faces.

I don't know if Bob Murray would like to comment on that or not?

Vice Chairman KERREY. We would be pleased to hear it.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you, Senator.

I share the view that the fusion center's idea seems to have caught on in the military. The CIA and other intelligence agencies are now working much harder. John Deutch, as DCI, has energized the military intelligence support for the military. Vice Admiral Blair and now General Gordon who is the man in the job responsible for that, are working quite hard at it in my observation of them. Intelligence figures more prominently in military exercises and so all of that is getting better.

I suspect, however, Senator, that perfection has not overtaken us. That there is more to be done.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Colonel Lang, could I draw you into this as well, because it seems to me that one of the things I have got to be able to do after I have got the signals, the big box full of signals, and after I have got a big box full of images, and I have got all this other stuff arrayed before me, I have got to understand the

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political and the cultural scene in Saudi Arabia in order to be able to convert it, or wherever else the situation is.

Do you think we have a sufficient understanding of, you know, inside of our Intelligence Community of the—of what's going on on the ground in order to be able to fuse in a useful fashion the intel that we collect?

Colonel LANG. Well, I think there are a number of really significant problems in the intelligence business in town today. I have been out of the Government now for 2 years and really have had nothing to do with this, but people still talk to me and I read the newspapers. It seems to me that many of the same problems persist and in some ways have gotten worse.

On the analytic side, it is all too easy to focus on some little team of people who you send somewhere, they've got a string of initials in front of their names, and who handle the delivery of raw information, and not pay enough attention to the analytic brains that takes that material and forms it into something useful and gives it to a commander, as General Trainor, Admiral Long said, who can do something with it.

I think there is far too much attention paid these days in the Intelligence Community to issues of structure, communications, bureaucratic responsibility up and down the chain of command, and too little attention paid to the quality of the brains of the analysts that are dealing with the issues.

People—there has been a lot of talk here about the cultural differences of the Saudis and various other people. I have spent practically my whole adult life dealing with Arabs and it was my business for a long, long time, and no one respects the differences in their culture more than I do. In fact, the people who take this raw information and form it into useful things have to understand that clearly. Once they can tell you what are the issues involved for people who may bomb your installations or may shoot your people in the streets, things like that, and they give it to a commander on the ground, then that commander and the chain of command, military chain of command that he represents up the line, have got to be willing to do something with it. That applies equally when the complaint from the field arrives in Washington and somebody says they, the Saudis, won't move the fence, then somebody with political clout has to be willing to go to the appropriate government—in this case, the Saudi government—and tell them that we must have that moved. We are your partners in your defense, and you must move it.

So I think the issues here are quite strong in the area of intelligence analysis and collection as well, in the HUMINT field, which I know something about. But there are also very strong issues of what the Government will do in terms of policy. The Saudi official, who was not named, who said in the *New York Times* on Sunday, that if they had come to us at the political level, we would have done something about that, I think was probably absolutely correct. We have to ask ourselves, why didn't the military chain of command function.

Vice Chairman KERREY. One additional follow up, Mr. Lang, to you, and then I will be through with my questions. For the entire period of the cold war, during which the United States and the So-

viet Union were engaged in very real life and death struggles, including wars—the Vietnam War is a relevant example, at least for me—but that was not the only place where the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in life or death mortal conflict. During that entire period we maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, because we knew it was in our interest to do so. Now we weren't doing it as a gesture to them, we were doing it because we believed it was good for us.

Are we, for understandable reasons in denying Ambassadorial contact with Iran, are we denying ourselves simultaneously the opportunity to acquire intelligence that would be useful for national security reasons?

Colonel LANG. Of course. It is a political decision that has to be made for a variety of policy reasons. But from the point of view of the collection, the obtaining of information for government uses, the lack of a diplomatic platform for overt diplomats and anybody else who you have in the embassy, is a severe handicap for any power, trying to deal with information requirements out there. This was very true of our friends the Israelis. For many many years, you know, they had severe handicaps in trying to deal with real issues of information collection in the Arab world, because in fact they couldn't go there. They had no platform from which to collect. This was a very severe problem for them, and one which is being relieved.

Vice Chairman KERREY. I want to thank you and I want to thank all the witnesses, and you Chairman, as well, for holding this hearing. It's a very important hearing, and I appreciate you willing to take the time and make the effort to come and talk to the American people.

Thank you.

Chairman SPECTER. Colonel Lang, we didn't give you a chance initially to make your opening statement. Let's do that at this time. You had been on duty as a colonel in the military. You have the Presidential rank of distinguished executive, having been signed by President Bush. We are glad to have you here. Your statement is a relatively brief one and we would appreciate it if you would present it to us.

Colonel LANG. Actually, sir, I would rather make reference to it, and speak to that as well as other issues.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that's fine; handle it as you choose. The floor is yours.

## STATEMENT OF COLONEL PAT LANG, USA (Ret.) FORMER DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Colonel LANG. Thank you.

In listening to what my colleagues here have said previously, I decided that I would rather shift the focus a little bit on what I was going to say.

I think the intelligence issues which have been brought up, which are, of course, appropriate to this committee, are very severe ones. I have already said what I have to say about analysis. I think you have to be very, very careful what kind of people you hire as analysts, whether it be in CIA, DIA, Office of Naval Intelligence or wherever, because to be a really good analyst at the strategic—and

I was one for a long time—to be a good analyst at the strategic level, in dealing especially with alien cultures, strange cultures, requires a cast of mind which is—possession of person who has a wide, wide range of interests, deeply interested in history, other people's philosophy, their ethnology, all that kind of thing, so that this person can integrate the information as to what is now going on into the pattern of past events so that it has some meaning and can be given to a commander so that you don't just give them a thousand reports that there may be bombings in Beirut. You tell them what this means, and what is really likely to happen.

To find people like that, you have to look for people with the right kind of academic background. You have to look for people with the right habits of mind. Many, many people are not suited to this kind of work. They are, in fact, people who have a very hard time dealing with issues of possible future events of a kind that have not come within their personal experience. There are all kinds of echoes of this in what has been said here about; did this group understand that this size bomb could be used in the future, did this group understand that because it had never happened in Dhahran, it could happen in Dhahran? You know, there are habits of mind here which are real inhibitions to sound analysis.

For somebody in Dhahran to say that we've never seen bigger than a 200-pound bomb in Saudi Arabia—if that's what was said—so we're unlikely to have this other one, implies that the terrorists don't watch CNN. I mean, CNN is worldwide. They saw the bomb that was used in Oklahoma City. It was explained in great detail how you construct a fertilizer bomb. This may or may not have been a fertilizer bomb. It could have been LPG or anything else. But you have got to have people to do the analytic work for this kind of thing who have the right kind of mentality. You can't have bureaucrats. If you have bureaucrats who want to hide behind some committee's judgment as to what may or may not happen and want to go through six layers of approvals before a judgment is given to somebody, then you never get any quality in the advice that is given to commanders.

On the collection side, there is a limit to what can be said in a forum like this, but I would say with regard to HUMINT that for the last 15 years or so, I have been hearing all kinds of statements made about how we need to have better HUMINT, we need to have better HUMINT. You know, why wasn't the HUMINT better?

Well, the fact of the matter is that people are on to the right thing here. We should have better HUMINT. By this I mean the kind of information which penetrates these organizations and which tells you what they are going to do. Nobody can tell me that that is impossible. I really know better than that. Nobody can tell me that that is impossible.

But the fact of the matter is that although we have paid lip service in countless hearings and statements and commissions and all kinds of fora to this issue, our system works in such a way in the Intelligence Community and in the Government at large so as to inhibit the creation of operations of that kind. In fact, over the years, we have put more and more and more restrictions on the HUMINT operators that effectively keep them from going out and doing that kind of work. There are all kinds of really petty restric-

tions as to what you can do with money and what you can do with that kind of operation. So you know you really can't have it both ways. I don't mean this personally in any way, but the country can't have it both ways.

If you are going to have a very, very rigidly controlled HUMINT operations system, you are going to have a rigidly controlled output from the HUMINT operations system. In recent years, the tendency has been more and more this way. I mean, you can say what you like about the issues of ethics involved, but what I see in the HUMINT world is increasingly a tendency to condemn the HUMINT operations people for associating with people who have the ability to penetrate the groups that you want to penetrate. You cannot penetrate an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group unless you are using somebody who plausibly will be believed to be an Islamic terrorist. This is a big problem.

At some point, instead of people just talking about HUMINT and the fact that it's inadequate, they have to decide what they want and what they are willing to let the HUMINT people do.

Did you want to ask me something, sir?

Admiral LONG. May I——

Chairman SPECTER. Go ahead, Admiral Long.

Admiral LONG. May I comment on that.

Chairman SPECTER. There are quite a few things I want to ask you, Colonel Lang, but we'll hear from Admiral Long first.

Admiral LONG. I would agree with the Colonel here that to have an effective HUMINT—and I am not an intelligence specialist, although I sat on some advisory committees to the Director of Central Intelligence—but to establish a HUMINT network takes the talent and it also takes time. This is one of the things that I would hope that if this independent commission that needs to be set up, really looks at how well are we doing in HUMINT, and how—what do we need to do to really improve it. Just looking at some of the things just a few years ago, we didn't have many people that could speak Arabic. We didn't have many people who really, in the Intelligence Community could speak, say, Chinese. These are the things that I think Colonel Lang was talking about. We have to get people in there. Not only collect it, but analyze it.

I would hope that this independent commission that has been set up is truly going to take a look at this, a hard look, because I think this is critical.

Colonel LANG. Sir?

Chairman SPECTER. Go ahead, Colonel Lang.

Colonel LANG. If I may, Admiral Long made me think of a related collection issue. That is the fact that it is quite evident to me over the years that although the military chain of command especially up in the rarefied regions of the unified commanders and people of that kind—very easily say that they would like to have more and better intelligence support, that they would like to have more and better HUMINT. It's quite a different thing from the point of view of the people who have to do these things—the senior commanders—to try to get them to approve the operations that are needed to obtain that information. I think at some point, you know, there has to be a resolution of that difficulty, because I worked this for a long, long time, and my experience is that the same com-

manders who will tell you that they wanted more and better support from you, when you propose an operation to get that support, were often completely unwilling to coordinate, as the bureaucratic expression would be, on the operation so you could run it in their theater.

That's a big problem for the intelligence people. I mean, they are very easy to blame, the intelligence people, because they are usually voiceless, faceless people—I am just getting my day in court here——

[General laughter.]

Admiral LONG. I think he's talking to me.

Colonel LANG. No, sir, I am not talking to you particularly, no. But I just wanted to say that much about the issues of analysis and collection.

There is another issue I would like to address about the issue of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which I think is critical to this situation.

Chairman SPECTER. Let us come back to that in a few moments. We had moved to the questioning of Mr. Murray without ever giving him a chance to make an opening statement, and I would like to do that at this time.

Mr. Murray is president of the Center for Naval Analysis, and a member of the Long Commission. We welcome you here. Thank you for taking time, Mr. Murray, and let us give you an opportunity now, if you care to make some generalized comments.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and——

Admiral LONG. May I just have a preface to what Mr. Murray is in?

Chairman SPECTER. By all means, Admiral Long.

Admiral LONG. When we first set up the Commission, we only had four senior military people on it. The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, said Bob, don't you think you should have a civilian. And I said, well, gee, it's sort of a military thing. But I guess so. Let me tell you, that was the smartest thing that we did, and that was to put Bob Murray on there because he gave a breadth to the commission's look that we would not have had without him. So he was a tremendous asset to us.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, with that eloquent recommendation, the floor is your's, Mr. Murray.

## STATEMENT OF ROBERT MURRAY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS, FORMER MEMBER OF LONG COMMISSION

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman.

It is now going to sound a little gratuitous, but I have to kick that ball back to Admiral Long. I think your point about how the Long Commission Report was thorough and incisive is attributable to Admiral Long's great intelligence, skill and integrity. He bored in on the issues. It is a report that stood the test of time because of his leadership and direction. The work Admiral Long led has been very valuable to our country.

I will just say a few things, if I may, Mr. Chairman, by way of introduction. First, I am not really a Middle East expert, although I have worked in the area and had responsibilities for that area of American policy in various administrations. But I am certainly not

an intelligence person; I have only used intelligence for policy purposes.

Second, by and large, I share most of the observations already offered by other members of this panel.

Mr. Chairman, I notice that every administration since World War II, with perhaps one exception, has had a crisis in the Middle East; that probably says something about the nature of the Middle East, as well as something about the nature of our interests there. Parenthetically, to address an earlier question, we are not always better informed or wiser because we have diplomatic relations—sometimes diplomatic relations help in the way that Colonel Lang suggested, but sometimes it is insufficient. We had very good diplomatic relations with Iran, yet we didn't see that the Shah was about to fall. We have good diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, but we didn't know that the recent bombing would occur. So you can be present, but still not know enough.

HUMINT is similar. You may really want it, but if you haven't prepared—if you haven't done the things you need to do to get HUMINT, you won't have it. Having HUMINT in these difficult situations requires us to reconcile what we stand for as a country and what our ethics are, with the practical requirements of HUMINT operation. Like Admiral Long, if someone is commissioning a new commission on this subject, that ought to be one of the questions they tackle: What is the United States prepared to do, if anything, to have effective HUMINT operations? If we are not prepared to ask and answer this question, then maybe we ought to stop talking about why we don't have HUMINT when we want it.

Regarding Lebanon in 1983, Admiral Long read the pertinent parts of the report. These are the key parts of the Report for the committee's consideration. There were something like 100 intelligence reports of possible car bombs that the Intelligence Community had given to the Marine commander before the actual bomb went off. No doubt the Marines became a little insensitive to the reports over time, especially since the reports actually weren't specific enough to do anything about.

There were several things in Lebanon in 1983 that were different than Saudi Arabia today.

First of all, of course, as General Trainor said, we were in the middle of both a conventional Lebanese civil war, which posed a military threat, and terrorist actions, probably sponsored by outside states. So we had to worry both about bullets and mortar rounds and about terrorists. That made Lebabon a particularly difficult problem. Also, there were countless actors in Lebanon: Israelis, Syrians, Iranians, French, British, Americans, as well as all of the factions in Lebanon. It was a very tough set of circumstances, and very different circumstances from those in Saudi Arabia today.

There was in Lebanon in 1983 a substantial American policy failure. We really had unrealistic diplomatic objectives, and in any event they were unattained. The military mission to Lebanon, which began as a small mission of presence and neutrality, came to be another altogether different and much more dangerous kind of mission over the months. The situation in Saudi Arabia is different. As you say, Mr. Vice Chairman, in Saudi Arabia it was already clear that we were taking sides.

The military chain of command in Lebanon was very cumbersome and not sufficiently attentive. I don't know if that is true in today's Saudi situation. Certainly the chain of command appears to be more streamlined today, although I am not more than a newspaper reader of the Saudi situation. From press accounts, it appears the USAF commanders on the ground didn't raise the security issues that were bothering them to higher authority, nor did they take the actions within their own capacity to move Air Force personnel to a safer place.

It seems to me that both in the Saudi situation and in the Lebanese situation, people failed to get their minds around the magnitude of the possibilities. And not getting their mind around it, they made errors of judgment about how to deal with particular circumstances on the ground. In Lebanon, the failure was a policy failure; in Saudi Arabia, it appears to be a local military failure.

As Admiral Long said, the Intelligence Community in Lebanon was providing a large quantity of info, more than the Marine command could actually process; that was the origin of our fusion center idea. People need to provide information in a format useful to the military commander.

But again, even if they had done that in Lebanon, the commander wouldn't have had the information he needed to keep his unit safe in the circumstances he was in.

The subject of "mission creep" was earlier mentioned. I distinguish between mission creep and mission adjustment. Mission creep is something that happens to you without, in my opinion, without understanding what is really going on there and how it is affecting you. Mission adjustment to me would be something quite proper, when you go in and you see that the circumstances are changing and you adjust the role of the military in a useful way.

In Lebanon, I think it was clearly mission creep. They accreted missions that made the military more vulnerable and they lacked the capacity to deal with that.

Also, in some ways not dissimilar to Saudi Arabia, the physical location in Lebanon was a tough one. The building the Marines were in in Lebanon was a 2½-foot thick concrete building, a building that the Israelis had used for their headquarters. It provided lots of protection against the things that were happening to the Marines every day—mortar shells, snipers, and the like. It just didn't provide protection against a truck with 12,000 pounds of explosive. Somebody told me that 12,000 pounds of explosive is equivalent of a small tactical nuclear weapon. I don't know if that is true, but the 12,000 pounds certainly had a great effect on the building. Buildings 900 feet away were structurally damaged. The terrorists could have parked the truck outside on the street, they didn't have to drive into the building to destroy it. Tremendous casualties would have occurred.

So I think the lesson of Lebanon clearly—and the lessons of the Middle East—clearly haven't been well enough absorbed somehow. Like Admiral Long, I very much hope that this commission that gets commissioned, would deal with why that is so, down to the level of training and instruction to military commanders. How are the commanders and staff being trained before they deploy to these places.

Another experience I have in working in the Middle East is that, by and large, having a lot of Americans on the ground is not a good thing in these countries. Find ways to stay off shore, if possible. If you can find a way not to be on shore, it's better for local governments and it is better for Americans. Local governments often get attacked politically if they allow too many U.S. troops on their land. Most local governments in the Middle East are not deeply strong governments. I don't mean that they are in danger of falling. I think the Saudis probably have a fairly robust government in their circumstances. But it is "in their circumstances;" they are not Britain, France, Germany, Japan—it isn't so easy for them to be host to lots of Americans.

Those were the points I particularly wanted to make, Mr. Chairman. I certainly associate with all the comments that Admiral Long made about how we might think about Lebanon and dealing with terrorism.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Murray.

Colonel Lang, you had suggested a comment about the United States-Saudi relations. Let us turn to you on that.

Colonel LANG. Thank you, sir.

First, if I may, I would like to say a word about surprise. This issue has come up here two or three times in the course of this, and it is certainly true that we were surprised by this bomb in Dhahran. This kind of thing, in my experience, happens over and over and over again, in the part of the world I dealt with. In this regard I think you have to differentiate between surprise and effective warning, or warning and effective warning.

It's one thing for the information to be available on which reasonable, well informed people can base a deduction that something bad is likely to happen. It is another thing for the decisionmaker, when he is given that information, to take effective action on it.

In this area you have a recurring phenomenon, that people question warning severely, as to its antecedents, the logic behind it, the strength of the evidence, etc., etc. Often it is much, much more comfortable not to take action on the basis of some intelligence man's warning, which is based on evidence which is always ambiguous, always ambiguous. And never totally conclusive. There always will be some people in the Intelligence Community that don't agree with it, or there are locals that don't agree with it, something like this.

So warning, I have to say, is a big problem, and the issue of avoiding surprise is a really exercising issue. The Intelligence Community has tried to come to grips with it a number of times, and there is no satisfactory answer to this that I know of, to tell you the truth.

On the issue of United States-Saudi relations, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I was the Defense Attache in Saudi Arabia for several years in the eighties and then subsequently when I was the head intelligence analyst for the Middle East in DOD, I had to deal with issues of Saudi Arabia all the time, and the very issues that Mr. Murray raises about sensitivity to our presence.

Chairman SPECTER. When were you an intelligence officer in DOD?

Colonel LANG. I was Defense Attache in Saudi Arabia from 1982 through 1984, and then I was the Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, South Asia and Terrorism, from 1985 to 1992.

Chairman SPECTER. In Washington.

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir. Well, I traveled a lot to the area, of course.

Chairman SPECTER. But headquartered here.

Colonel LANG. Yes, headquartered here.

Chairman SPECTER. Through 1992?

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir.

It became evident to me over the years that there is a fundamental problem in United States-Saudi relations at the working level. I don't think there is as much of a problem at the political level. But at the working level there is a significant problem that tends to percolate up and down the chain of command in our government, which you hear expressed in such statements as the one I read in the press by a high U.S. official that they are doing us a favor by letting us be in their country, something to that effect.

At the same time, I heard a Saudi diplomat say something to the effect the other day, that we, the Saudis, will be responsible for the security of our own country.

Well, the problem with both those statements is that neither one of them really corresponds very well to the reality of the situation as it has been for any number of years. In fact, what you have between the United States and Saudi Arabia is a true symbiotic relationship. The United States and its allies and its trading partners need the petroleum of the gulf, and they need to have all those petrodollars recycled into the world economy. That is an absolute necessity.

On the other hand, on the Saudi side, although it is true they are responsible for the defense of their country, the fact of the matter is that they have not been and are not likely to be capable of it. Their big difficulty in trying to face up to countries the size of Iran and Iraq who have a very significant military potential is that military power essentially comes from two things; one is the possession of equipment—the Saudis don't have a problem with that. Their ability to pay their way has always provided them with all the tools that they really needed. The other thing that military power comes from is having enough people to put in your armed forces, people who can be trained to a sufficient level so that you have real units that can employ the equipment in an effective way against the probable opponent. That is what they don't have.

It is one of the nifty little things about the mythology of the Middle East that nobody looks very hard at the demographic statistics of Saudi Arabia. In fact, in many ways their census figures are sort of magical. If you look at them, they run up and down against constants punched out on a calculator somewhere, and they obviously suit some purpose of their own, but they don't have much to do with how many people there are.

The truth of the matter is that in Saudi Arabia, the population is very small relative to the size of the country that would have to be defended and the kind of opponents they would have. This has made them and will continue to make them very dependent on external protection from regional opponents.

The fact of the matter is that they really need us. There is nobody else who can really do the job of protecting them from their external opponents the way the United States can. You could say that some other country would step in here, but the truth is that we are the top of the line, and they like the top of the line. There is no doubt that nobody can protect them the way that we can, and we have demonstrated that 5 years ago with a crushing display of force against a regional opponent.

In spite of these facts, over the years, a culture has grown up on the U.S. military side, running up and down from the military training missions in Saudi Arabia—and there have been several over the years—up through the chain of command all the way into the DOD, that basically says that Saudis have all kinds of internal problems, that they have these profound cultural differences, that they are very sensitive to this or that, all these kinds of things, and that we can't ask them too much. This tends or permeate the chain of command. When we conducted negotiations with them, the people we were dealing with knew very clearly that they weren't under a lot of pressure to do what it was that you thought ought to be done.

Chairman SPECTER. Have you seen that cultural differences permeate the chain of command over the course of your work, Attache from 1982 to 1984, and then intelligence in Washington, 1985 to 1992?

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir. I would say that an exaggerated reaction to Saudi—supposed Saudi cultural sensitivities, has tended to permeate the U.S. chain of command. I think that is absolutely true. It contributes to situations like the one which you are looking into. I don't know anything more about this than what I read in the newspaper, but the newspapers have been pretty good on this. If it is true what the *New York Times* said a couple of days ago, that an American Air Force colonel in Dhahran took his Saudi counterpart, a wing commander, out to that fence and showed it to him a couple of times and said that that fence needed to move out, and essentially got a wave off and was walked away from, well, I am sure that American colonel and whoever the general was on the base knew very well that there was something wrong with that situation. I mean, they watch CNN, too. But apparently not much was done about it. It seems that this did not go up the chain of command effectively; that the U.S. chain of command did not function effectively in this way, in the way that General Trainor said. There has to be a reason why that happened.

I would suggest to you that the reason why nothing effective happened was that the men on the ground in Dhahran knew that if they pushed this, they would get a very negative response.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Colonel Lang, on a rather mundane subject relating to the HUMINT point that you made earlier,you made the point that we have established rules, regulations, sometimes written, unwritten, in response to problems and/or mistakes made on the HUMINT side, that then make it difficult for us to carry out the human intelligence effort. That is essentially——

Colonel LANG. I did say that, yes, sir.

Vice Chairman KERREY. I would agree with you, by the way. I don't disagree with that.

But the mundane part, it seems to me, is another issue, and that is a question. Do we have, both on the defense side and on the civilian side, do we have personnel policies in place that enable us to recruit the kinds of people that you describe, with the promise that there is a clear career path for you over a 20 or 30 year effort that it might take to both acquire skills and understanding as well as acquire the contacts that very often are necessary to determining whether or not the intel is any good or not. So the question is whether or not we have got personnel policies in the Department of Defense that would enable the Department of Defense, because we have some very good defense attaches, as well, enable them or the Central Intelligence Agency to recruit, retain, and promote based upon the belief that there is a good career pattern here.

Colonel LANG. Is this for collection or analysis or both?

Vice Chairman KERREY. Analysis.

Colonel LANG. OK. Because these are separate career fields normally.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Yes.

Colonel LANG. There are a few people who work in both these areas. I am one of them. But most people stay on one side or the other.

I would say on the analytic side that—that the problem is not so bad in terms of the initial recruitment so much as what happens to people as they spend a lot of time in one of these great big bureaucratic organizations. In the Department of Defense, the area I am more familiar with, I think the process is much too heavily bureaucratized, that is, the process of analysis. This is a great, sort of heavy hand that lies on the analysts' hearts. As young men and women struggle to deal with these very complex issues, very hard things to understand, write these papers, give briefings that are difficult as the devil to do. Over the years the constant pressure of being asked by a bureaucratic organization not to say things that are too radical, not to say things that will rock the boat, not to say things that will get your boss in trouble. This tends to weed out the best of these people.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Let me just make an observation. I mean, is it a coincidence that the people that I have met thus far on the defense side that are good, either at collecting or analysis, or doing both, in that rare individual, that most of them remain below the general staff level; most of them are colonels or below.

Colonel LANG. I take your point. I think that it is not an accident at all. This is true for military personnel in the Department of Defense, no matter what service they come from.

Vice Chairman KERREY. Do we send a message in—personnel policies on the defense side, say if you want to make general, don't get in this business.

Colonel LANG. No, I don't think so. The message is not don't go into intelligence business if you want to make general. The message is, if you want to make general, don't be a real intelligence officer. Don't be somebody who is concerned with the business of intelligence. Be someone who is concerned with the business of management. Typically, that is the pattern of promotion.

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey. Were you finished, Colonel Lang?

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. With respect to the Saudi-United States relationship, you had talked to me earlier about the background of the relationship with respect to the Saudi's view of U.S. military on so-called being hired hands. Would you amplify on that?

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir, I can say something about that.

One of the problems in the Saudi economy, on-going, because of the very small demographic base, is that the country runs on foreign workers. I mean, there are usually two or three million foreign workers in Saudi Arabia at all levels, from management down to pick and shovel people. These folks are a permanent fixture there. They come and they go, they have work permits, they are not Saudi citizens, they have no prospects of being Saudi citizens, and they are just there, to be used for jobs that the population—the citizen population of Saudi Arabia does not wish to participate in.

Because of that and also because of the fact that Saudi Arabia is such a traditional Islamic country, there is a very great reluctance on the part of the mass of Saudi citizens to see the United States as—using the word that you used earlier—as an ally. That is not really the conception of things. The word for ally in Arabic is *hilf*, means something very particular. This almost always applies to another Arab or Moslem state, and not to non-Moslem states. Instead, the conception of the status of our people there and the relationship between our two countries, on the part of many, many Saudis, is that this is a relationship which is unfortunately necessitated by regional threats. This relationship is backed up by various memoranda on specific narrow issues. There are all kinds of results of planning conferences that people have initialed. But none of these amount to a treaty of alliance by which a Saudi would see that American soldiers are their allies, the way that Germans would say that the American soldiers on their soil are allies.

Instead, our people are viewed by most Saudis as just another kind of guest worker in their country. So there is a very limited requirement for the Saudis to give a sympathetic hearing to what they have to say. This contributes, I think, to the kind of reaction you have had in this situation in and which, as I said before, an American colonel can go out and talk to his counterpart and point to a very real security issue involving American troops, and essentially be ignored and not have anything happen about that.

I say that in the belief that if this issue had been pressed up the chain of command to the political level and expressed to the Saudi government, the fence would have been moved. But I think that there is this kind of psychological barrier in the average Saudi's attitude toward us, and over the years it has influenced thinking in the American chain of command, so that people have what one senior U.S. Government official described to me once as a philosophy of minimal expectations in Saudi Arabia. I think that thinking permeates the atmosphere in United States-Saudi relations.

Typically Americans in Saudi Arabia tend to say things like, "Well, that's how things are, you know, and you can't do anything about that." I would say that's not true, you can do something about that. Because these two countries are bound together by such a strong community of interest.

Chairman SPECTER. Colonel Lang, you had commented in our discussion before today about a concept of *mamluk*?

Colonel LANG. Well, I have a background in Islamic history, and I would say that the idea of hired soldiery is a cultural concept which is firmly lodged among all the other concepts that were mentioned here today. The idea is not alien in the Islamic cultural context that you would have on your soil soldiers who were hired, or owned, to do your fighting.

Chairman SPECTER. What is that word precisely, *mamluk*?

Colonel LANG. *Mamluk. Mamluk* means something which is owned, and it was used in the Islamic cultural context in various places and times to refer to soldiers who were either hired or owned.

Chairman SPECTER. And the differences, as you had explained it to me, go back to very fundamental matters about the religious differences. Would you state for the record what you had said to me about arrests being made incommunicado with respect to praying in American's own homes?

Colonel LANG. You always have to keep this in mind when you're talking about Saudi Arabia, that this is a country which does not accept such Western ideas as freedom of religion and in this region I would point out that there is not a Christian church anywhere in the Kingdom that I know of. That is pretty much a unique situation in the Arab world, in the Moslem world, and that the exercise of Christianity as a public faith is simply not allowed. I remember quite clearly that in 1983 when I was the Defense Attache there, that there was a significant problem with the fact in the two new port cities that were being built—one was Yanbu on the Red Sea coast and the other was Jubail—on the Gulf coast, that there were many foreign workers, including a number of Americans there, and that the Saudi *mutawiin,* the religious police, took to raiding people's houses and arresting them because they were holding private prayer services with lay religious leaders. They held these people——

Chairman SPECTER. Those were homes of U.S. citizens?

Colonel LANG. Yes, and others. They didn't own them, of course, because you can't own property there if you are a foreigner.

Chairman SPECTER. U.S. citizens living in their homes, renting, praying——

Colonel LANG. Among other people.

Chairman SPECTER. What happened to them?

Colonel LANG. Oh, I remember quite distinctly that they were taken into custody by the religious police and held for days and days for interrogation. The Embassy worked very hard to get them out and succeeded in doing that. We didn't hold a press conference on the street somewhere about it, but the Embassy worked very, very hard to get them out, and successfully.

But I remember very clearly that happened. I thought it was quite awful.

Chairman SPECTER. In your written statement, Colonel Lang, you make this observation. As a result of my service in Saudi Arabia and all of the subsequent years in which I was intimately involved in the analysis of the circumstances of daily United States-Saudi relations, I have come to believe that much of the danger in

which our military personnel find themselves in the country, derives from flaws in the underlying relationship between our country and Saudi Arabia. The fault of this is equally divisible between the two parties. The problem is easily seen in recent statements by responsible parties representing the two countries. On the one hand, Secretary Perry has been quoted as saying in regard to our ability to insist on cooperation from the Saudis, something to the effect that, "they are doing us a favor by allowing us to be in the country. On the other hand, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States is quoted in the press as having said Sunday that, "we will be responsible for the security of our own country."

The difficulty is that neither of these pronouncements reflects the reality of the situation as it is now or has been for many years.

Could you amplify on that?

Colonel LANG. Yes, sir.

As I tried to say earlier, I think that the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are locked together in a relationship for which I think symbiotic is the right, in that the two countries need each other in a very deep kind of way. We need them essentially because we need their petroleum, for us and all our friends in the world. We need to have the money that they are paid for this petroleum recycled back into all the economies in the world.

On the other hand, their problem is that they really don't have the wherewithal in terms of people to defend their country. That was very clear in the Gulf War in 1990 in which their forces, although they played a role, played a small role as a junior partner in the huge coalition put together by the United States. Nobody else could have put this coalition together but the United States. Everybody knows that this is true. To suggest now that somehow they don't really need us and they are doing us a favor by letting us in their country I think is to distort the reality of the situation very greatly.

To further accept the idea that they will blithely say, "We are responsible for our country's defense," and that we would just accept that and say well, that's true, you really can take care of this by yourself, is, I think, equally to distort the fabric of reality.

The fact of the matter is we need each other, and the United States, as the great power that it is, should demand that its interests be respected, especially in things as fairly minor from the point of view of the interests of nations, as the security of our own personnel.

Chairman SPECTER. Colonel Lang, on page 3 of your statement, you say, senior USAF officers on the spot did not believe that they could successfully, "rock the boat," by complaining up the U.S. chain of command against local Saudi unwillingness to move the fence outward. Why was that? Why would they think that? I would submit to you that it was because the chain of command is permeated with the idea that Saudi sensitivities are paramount concerns of the United States.

You had testified earlier something about the same effect.

Colonel LANG. Yes, I did, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. That the Saudi—that that had permeated the chain of command. Is that something that is known by the upper echelons in the Pentagon?

Colonel LANG. Well, I doubt if anybody is going to sit here in uniform and testify about it. But I think——

Chairman SPECTER. How about somebody out of uniform, like Colonel Lang?

Colonel LANG. Well, Colonel Lang has already said quite a bit, Senator. I think it is certainly true that the pressures of life in Saudi Arabia and of working with the Saudis over the last 30 or 40 years, has caused there to be this kind of philosophy of minimal expectations. This is the idea that you can only press them to do so much. I think that is absolutely wrong as a working philosophy. As I said earlier in my statement, when the Iraqi wolf was at the door and it was very clear what might happen to Saudi Arabia, all of a sudden all the things that I had seen for many years as being insuperable problems, about U.S. military aircraft clearances and funds being allocated for this or that, or agreement on this or that issue, the difficulties just all disappeared overnight and things that had been impossible became something that you could get done.

Now that the immediate threat has disappeared, 5 years later, we seem to be back just about where we were before the Gulf War in terms of the relationship, except that we've got more people in there. As this gentleman to my left said, the more people you've got there the bigger target you are if your security isn't good enough.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Colonel Lang, was the Pentagon on notice that this attitude permeated the chain of command so that the Pentagon should have been observant as to what was going on in Saudi Arabia?

Colonel LANG. I think this attitude is so pervasive, running up the chain of command, into the heart of the Department of Defense, that I think it is just an assumption of daily life, you know, that you can't push the Saudis very far. I think that has become an assumption. It is an assumption which ought to be examined carefully.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, by all indications it has been examined carefully in the past few days. But what you are saying is, not before. If we are to remain in Saudi Arabia, as important as our interests are there, there has to be a relationship.

We had, in the Senate Intelligence Committee, at the request of Prince Bandar, and I don't intend to go into what we covered there, that he came to the Intelligence Committee and we had a closed session where he was present for about an hour and a quarter, on what we can do to improve the relationship. The importance that we talked about, which I think is fair to say, that there has to be attention at the highest levels, that if something doesn't get done, like the chain fence moved or the questioning of the terrorists, that it be taken up at a higher level.

The question which we have here in assessing accountability, if the Pentagon knows that there is this mentality, that lower level officers in Saudi Arabia, U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia are not going to rock the boat, and that the boat needs to be rocked, is there a duty, are they on notice that they ought to be taking some special precautions given that mental attitude which you described?

Colonel LANG. Well, I think we ought to clean up our act. This is a large part of the thrust of the little paper that I wrote for you,

sir. You know, I think we ought to ask, was this really a Saudi problem? I think, as a retired U.S. officer, I would have to say that I think it was more our problem than their's, because we knew clearly what had to be done and we didn't do it, our chain of command didn't function. We need to reach down through the chain of command, all the way down to the bottom, and to people that—you must understand that your duty to the United States and to your men is such that you will not, in fact, consider yourself to be somebody who has been loaned out to the Saudis so that they're going to tell you what to do and you're going to say, yes, sir.

Chairman SPECTER. The chain of command didn't function from the top of the Pentagon down?

Colonel LANG. Sir, I only know what I have read about this but based on my experience with this matter, it does not seem to me that the chain of command functioned effectively or that fence would have been moved. Anybody who knows anything about bombs knows that the farther out you moved that fence, the less effective the bomb would be.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Mr. Murray has said, Colonel Lang, and I want to ask Mr. Murray about this, that the lessons of Lebanon—and I tried to write this down exactly—the lessons of Lebanon were not well enough learned. Would you agree with that?

Colonel LANG. Well, I don't think we've done anything effective about HUMINT in the Middle East. If that was one of the lessons of Lebanon.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Mr. Murray comments not only about HUMINT, but about training of commanders.

Colonel LANG. Well, I would say that of the really senior officers I have seen involved in the Middle East, U.S. officers, that very few of them really knew very much about the Middle East when they were assigned there. They usually are fine operators or fine logisticians or whatever it is that they come from, but they were not picked for their knowledge, understanding of the political situation, culture, ethnology, etc., of the Middle East. They generally arrive on the scene not knowing much. There have been a couple of exceptions.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Mr. Murray comments about when he said lessons of Lebanon not well enough learned, not well enough absorbed were his words, and then he mentioned the training of commanders. Would you say they were not well enough trained?

Colonel LANG. Most commanders in my experience—of course, my experience is from the intelligence side of the fence—do not use intelligence very effectively. They are not very well trained in that. They tend to have a negative attitude toward intelligence operations. That is a training flaw, in my view.

In terms of the Middle East, most of the senior officers I have seen arrive in their jobs were not very well educated about the Middle East, and it takes a long time for them to learn about it.

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Murray, when you say the lessons of Lebanon were not well enough absorbed, and you make a number of specifications, including the training of commanders, what do we need to do to learn the lesson of Lebanon and the 12,000-pound bomb and the 241 Marines that you and Admiral Long did such an

excellent job analyzing and concluding on the Long Commission report.

Mr. MURRAY. On 12,000-pound bombs, you've got to impress on commanders that 12,000-pound bombs are possible and that 12,000-pounds is not 200 pounds. It is an important piece of history that you want to make sure is in the training curriculum for officers, commanders, and staff.

Chairman SPECTER. Is that in the curriculum for training people from DOD?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not know, but if it isn't, it ought to be. If there is going to be a commission that looks at this particular incident in Saudi Arabia, then that—the training of commanders and how we prepare them—should be an important part of the curriculum. As Colonel Lang says, we don't get commanders based on their experience with particular parts of the world. Sometimes we do, but not necessarily.

Chairman SPECTER. Do you think there is a duty on the part of DOD, the Pentagon, to train commanders about the existence of 12,000-pound bombs?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, I do, Senator.

I think—could I say a couple more things? There were some differences that I think the present political leaders understand. One is that, unlike in Lebanon, the political objectives in Saudi Arabia, as far as I can tell from the newspapers, were clear. As far as I know, the mission of the forces in Saudi Arabia was also clear. It wasn't clear in Lebanon. As far as I know, the chain of command—who's in it, who's responsible for what—as far as I could tell reading the newspaper, was clear in the Saudi Arabia case, whereas it was not clear in the Lebanon case.

So you get right down to why didn't the colonel and the general do something about the fence. Like Colonel Lang, I cannot believe—I earlier had political responsibility for defense policy toward Saudi Arabia—I could not believe that, if the U.S. military concerns were brought up to the U.S. political level, and taken to the Saudis, the Saudis would not have done something about it. So why was it that we were on tenterhooks? Why did we think we couldn't raise these issues? Was it——

Chairman SPECTER. Do you agree with what Colonel Lang has said about the mentality of not wanting to rock the boat permeating the chain of command? Just not wanting to do anything because you would get your boss in trouble?

Mr. MURRAY. That may have been so at the lower levels. I mean, I think that is an important question to ask. Why was there this "don't pass it up the chain of command" kind of attitude. I think that ought to be examined. I think we also ought to be asking why Saudi intelligence was so bad. Why is it that they did not know this danger to U.S. forces existed. Why were they not helping more with the local security. How can a truck get that close to an American compound and folks just run away? If the newspaper accounts are accurate, these are some of the questions that concern me.

So I think there are a number of questions. They seem to be right down at the local level: Why did U.S. military commanders behave the way they did? Now, maybe they're behaving that way because they think they won't get the support up the line, but I can

tell you, when I was in the Pentagon, if I had had that security problem and somebody had brought it to me, and we were having troubles with the Saudi Arabians, I'd be going to Prince Bandar or Prince Sultan and saying, "We've got a real problem here and we need some help and we need it quickly."

Chairman SPECTER. That's what you would have done? Were you in the Pentagon?

Mr. MURRAY. I was in the Pentagon in the late seventies at the time of the—I have been in the Pentagon quite a while in different administrations.

Chairman SPECTER. In a civilian capacity?

Mr. MURRAY. In a civilian capacity. My last capacity on this matter was when I was a Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Carter administration. I dealt with the Middle East and Africa and South Asia.

Chairman SPECTER. Admiral Long, your report is certainly a landmark report, and perhaps as profound a statement as any is the one which you read, and I think is worth re-reading. "The October 23 catastrophe underscores the fact that terrorist warfare can have a significant political impact and demonstrates that the United States and specifically the Department of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat. Much needs to be done on an urgent basis to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare," which led me to my statement about a sense of urgency and business as usual.

You say here that the October 23 event with the 12,000-pound bomb shows that the, "Department of Defense is inadequately prepared to deal with this threat."

Based on the kinds of warnings there were, the perimeter of the fence, the experience of the 12,000-pound bomb, the speculation about a 200-pound bomb, was the Department of Defense adequately prepared to deal with this threat on June 25 of this year?

Admiral LONG. In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, these are the things that I hope that are going to be examined independently in this commission. I have not seen the charter, I have not seen the composition. But we need to understand that we need to go back and look at just how well is the Department of Defense training people for these contingencies, and as I have said earlier, in my judgment, the threat is not decreasing, the threat is increasing, not just with bombs, but with biological weapons, chemical weapons, and I hope never, but nuclear weapons. We need to examine just how well we are set up and how well our commanders are being trained, how well our people are being trained, how well are we educating our people as to the cultural, religious, political aspects of where they are. We also need to make sure that we are pursuing political diplomatic actions at the highest level in order to prevent some of these things.

But we need to keep in mind it is not just an easy answer. Intelligence plays a very, very important part insofar as avoiding the terrorist act. The political-diplomatic actions I think are terribly important here. Colonel Lang has talked about his perception of the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. I am not an expert on Saudi Arabia, but clearly this is an area that needs to be looked at in some depth. I am not just talking about

the fence—we know pretty well what happened to the fence. We need to look at this thing across the board in a broad way, and it needs to be supported right at the very highest level, because my sense is we are going to see more of these events.

Chairman SPECTER. Colonel Lang, I am asking you the same question about what the Long Commission concluded, specifically the Department of Defense, is it adequately prepared to deal with this threat as of the date of the Long Commission report; was it adequately prepared to deal with the threat faced in Saudi Arabia on June 25?

Colonel LANG. No, sir, I don't think so. I certainly support what the Admiral said. I would add to that that if the Department of Defense had adequately absorbed the lessons of his report and had acted on them in an effective way to make HUMINT really work in DOD, then we would have had this organization that bombed our men penetrated, and we would have known when they were coming. That is not impossible to do.

So——

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Murray, do you think that the DOD was adequately prepared to deal with the threat on June 25?

Mr. MURRAY. I think they were prepared in some ways. They, as I said, certainly understood that they had to have a clear objective for their activities, a clear mission for their troops, a reasonably clear set of policies to function. I think my observation, although it is a distant one, of Secretary Perry was that wherever there were troops, he would go visit them. So presumably he has talked to the commanders, thought about their problem.

But at the bottom level, if we are going to be a—run a worldwide foreign policy, engaged over the world, it is going to have to be a policy that is sustained. If you are going to have intelligence support, you are going to have to do this, as Colonel Lang says, over a great number of years. That level of effort on the HUMINT side, certainly doesn't seem to have been achieved by the U.S. Government, and I think it is a U.S. Government, not just a Pentagon part of that problem. And I, like Admiral Long, don't know whether or not the preparation of commanders was sufficient, but I certainly think it is an important question that people really ought to get to the bottom of. Admiral Long's point about having an independent look at that question seems to me to be a very pertinent one.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I do not know what will happen with respect to the appointment of a commission. That is an executive branch function. But I do believe that it is very important for congressional oversight to take a look at it and try to find the best answers that we can.

Admiral LONG. I strongly concur, Mr. Chairman, with that.

Chairman SPECTER. And for us to take a look at it. This has been a little more leisurely session than we usually have, because we have planned so many more panels. But I think it has been a very profound session. You men are men of enormous experience, and you mentioned at least twice, Admiral Long, maybe more, what we are doing on weapons of mass destruction. You wonder what the adequacy is of our defense as to that. When you have these kinds of warnings in Saudi Arabia, you have five U.S. citizens—five U.S.

Military personnel killed on November 13 last year. You have four men executed on May 31. Everybody is in a state of alarm there. You have a fence 80 feet away. You have on the record knowledge of 12,000-pound bombs. You have some speculation at the highest level of DOD that this is 10 times—the bomb exploded there, 3,000 to 5,000 pounds is 10 times the magnitude in the Mid East, and that is just a matter of arithmetic, but that is palpably wrong. Then as you mentioned, Admiral Long, a couple of times, what is happening with weapons of mass destruction. When the Inspector General of the CIA talks about the captain of the ship doctrine, dealing with the risks that are involved and the magnitude of the problem, when the Long Commission Report talks about much needs to be done on an urgent basis to prepare U.S. military forces to defend against and counter terrorist warfare, this is something we have to examine as to complacency, business as usual, or a sense of urgency.

Well, that is about as far as we can go. Thank you very much, gentlemen; thank you.

Admiral LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Thereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was recessed.]

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